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Abstract 
Whereas Marxism is a theory, or rather a cluster of theories, Leninism is something 
else: a political strategy. And as Lenin himself pointed out, strategies are neither true 
nor false, but only effective or ineffective, depending largely on the context within 
which they are carried out. In the context of today’s North America, however, the 
adoption by radical activists of the standard Leninist norms for anti-capitalist organizing 
would be counter-productive. What is needed now is a very different approach: a 
strategy of attrition, as Lenin would have said, rather than a strategy of overthrow. This 
article concludes by sketching an attrition strategy for contemporary anti-capitalist 
activism. 
 
Résumé 
Tandis que le marxisme est une théorie, ou plutôt un agrégat de théories, le léninisme 
est autre chose: une stratégie politique. Et, comme Lénine lui-même l’a souligné, les 
stratégies sont ni vraies ni fausses, mais seulement efficaces ou pas efficaces, en 
fonction du contexte dans lequel elles sont mises en œuvre. Toutefois, dans le contexte 
de l’Amérique du Nord d’aujourd’hui, l’adoption par des activistes radicaux des normes 
léninistes habituelles pour des mobilisations anti-capitalistes serait contre-productive. 
Une approche très différente est désormais nécessaire: une stratégie d’usure, comme 
Lénine l’aurait dit, au lieu d’une stratégie de renversement. Cet article conclut en 
esquissant une stratégie d’usure pour l’activisme anti-capitaliste contemporain. 
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Whereas Marxism is primarily a theory, or rather a cluster of theories, 
Leninism is something else: a political strategy. More specifically, Leninism 
is a political strategy for organizing radicals in pursuit of anti-capitalist 
revolution. In this paper I want to suggest a differentiated way of thinking 
about the kind of strategy proposed by Lenin. My aim is not historical. I 
make very little attempt to situate Lenin’s thinking in its original social 
context. Rather, my aim is forward-looking and political. I want to clarify 
the relevance of Lenin’s strategic framework for today’s anti-capitalist 
activism. 
I say ‘anti-capitalist activism,’ rather than ‘socialist activism,’ for 
two reasons. First, today many of those who identify as ‘socialists,’ 
especially those who adopt the label ‘democratic socialists,’ do not actually 
advocate an egalitarian post-capitalist economic democracy, but only an 
expansive welfare state variant of capitalism. For these socialists, 
questions of revolutionary strategy such as those addressed in this paper 
do not arise at all. Second, and conversely, many of those who today 
advocate dismantling capitalism and replacing it with an egalitarian post-
capitalist economic democracy do not use the word ‘socialism’ to designate 
their project, preferring terms like ‘participatory economics’ (Albert 2000), 
‘equitable cooperation’ (Hahnel 2005), ‘a self-governing society’ (Devine 
1988), ‘economic democracy’ (Schweickart 2002), ‘communalism’ 
(Bookchin 2002), and so on. My concern is revolutionary strategy – the 
development of a strategy for defeating capitalism and replacing it with a 
democratic and egalitarian post-capitalist alternative – and it is the 
expression ‘anti-capitalism’ rather than ‘socialism’ that most lucidly and 
unambiguously picks out the relevant political project (Callinicos 2003). 
Nevertheless, if by ‘socialism’ one means ‘egalitarian post-capitalist 
economic democracy,’ everything that I say about ‘anti-capitalist activism’ 
may be taken to apply to ‘socialist activism.’ 
Given the distance that separates the situation of revolutionaries in 
Lenin’s time and context from the predicament of their counterparts in 
contemporary North America, extracting insights from Lenin’s work to 
guide today’s anti-capitalist revolutionaries is no simple matter, and here I 
propose to proceed in a new way. In essence, my proposal is to divide 
Lenin’s strategic thinking into two levels, which I call the first-order and the 
second-order levels, respectively. It is not a distinction to which Lenin 
draws attention. But it is operative or ‘at work’ in what he says, and we can 
better understand what he does say if we keep the distinction in mind, as I 
hope to show. 
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As I use these terms, first-order strategic analysis proposes direct 
guidelines or prescriptions for political action, whereas second-order 
strategic analysis proposes guidelines not for political action, but for 
strategy development itself. Second-order strategic analysis, in short, does 
not propose strategies; it proposes general criteria for choosing among 
strategies, for counting some strategies as sound and others as ill-
considered. This first-order/second-order distinction calls attention to the 
difference, as we might also put it, between pragmatically determined 
strategy and social-theoretically determined meta-strategy.  
Consider a quick example, to clarify the contrast. If I suggest that a 
campaign of escalating disruptive direct action will force local politicians to 
reconsider their plans to implement a certain controversial measure, I am 
proposing a first-order strategy1, designed to guide the conduct of a conflict 
toward a successful outcome for one side. But suppose I instead suggest 
that the way to choose between rival strategic proposals is to identify the 
balance of forces between advocates and adversaries of the controversial 
measure, and to opt in favour of whichever proposed course of action (or 
first-order strategy) would maximize the capacity of the measure’s 
opponents to resist its implementation, and minimize the capacity of the 
measure’s advocates to carry out its implementation. This second 
suggestion makes a proposal on a different level altogether, the ‘second-
order’ or ‘meta-strategic’ level. On its own it tells us nothing about what is 
to be done. It does not itself propose or constitute a strategy but rather 
offers guidelines for directing the development or selection of a suitable 
strategy. 
In what follows, I begin by elucidating both Lenin’s first-order 
revolutionary strategy, which is usually called ‘Leninism,’ and his second-
order analysis of how to develop or choose a first-order strategy under 
various circumstances. I then review Lenin’s distinction (borrowed from 
Karl Kautsky) between strategies of attrition and strategies of overthrow. 
Against this background, I then suggest that Lenin’s second-order meta-
strategy implies that anti-capitalist activism in our own time should 
repudiate first-order Leninism, which is a strategy of overthrow, in favour 
                                                 
1
 By ‘strategy,’ I mean an action-guiding proposal for how to mobilize political capacities 
(forces, resources, opportunities) and deploy political tactics (strikes, demonstrations, civil 
disobedience, public advocacy campaigns, and so on) in order to achieve an outcome 
favourable to one side in a conflict. Tactics are methods used to advance a strategy. Note that 
a tactic can be either brief in duration (like a protest march) or extended over many years (like 
publishing a monthly magazine). Strategies, too, can be short-range (like an insurrectionary 
strategy) or long-range (like a protracted guerrilla warfare strategy). 
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of a strategy of attrition. Finally turning my attention to today’s anti-
capitalist movement, I briefly outline the elements of a strategy of anti-
capitalist attrition, as a first-order revolutionary strategy for our own non-
revolutionary times, which deviates from Lenin’s first-order strategy 
precisely because it complies with his meta-strategy. 
 
Lenin’s Principles of Strategy and Meta-Strategy 
When one says ‘Leninism,’ one does not usually mean Lenin’s world-view, 
with its ‘copy’ theory of knowledge (Lenin 1909), its ‘dialectical 
materialism’ (Lenin 1914), its progress-relativist theory of morality (Lenin 
1920c), its ‘labour aristocracy’ theory of opportunism (Lenin 1917a), and 
so on. Rather, by ‘Leninism’ one usually means only the first-order 
revolutionary strategy proposed by Lenin, especially as this took its 
mature shape, and to some extent underwent a certain codification, in the 
context of the early congresses of the Communist International.  
 No doubt, some will object to my account – or to any particular 
account – of first-order Leninism, but I believe that a relatively 
uncontroversial characterization of some of the key elements of this first-
order strategy can be stated in the form of six strategic principles for 
revolutionary activism plus one grand-strategic line of march. By ‘grand 
strategy’ I mean an overall account of the character of the revolutionary 
project in a particular time and place, which prescribes a particular 
developmental trajectory for the revolutionary movement: a wide-lens 
story of how we get from here to there. Lenin’s grand-strategic line of 
march looks to the global working class, with its strategically sensitive 
location at the centre of the capitalist mode of production, to be the leading 
force of a broader anti-capitalist alliance of workers with the impoverished 
peasantry and other exploited ‘intermediate classes.’ This alliance, led by 
the political forces of a hegemonic working class, would pursue an 
ambitious transformative project, with two aspects. First, it would bring to 
completion by revolutionary means the democratic agenda that had been 
abandoned by capitalism’s elites, including displacing autocratic regimes 
with democratic republics under universal suffrage, securing equal civil 
rights for all citizens, redistributing land to the peasants, and winning self-
determination for oppressed nations. Second, it would use state power to 
push the democratic revolution – either very quickly (see Lenin 1917b) or 
in a later stage of an extended revolutionary process (see Lenin 1905) – to 
burst the bounds of liberal capitalism and undertake the expropriation of 
the capitalist class and the construction of a post-capitalist, socialist 
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political and economic order on a global scale. This grand strategy is not 
central to my argument in this paper, since what is most distinctive about 
Lenin’s first-order strategy is its particular set of organizational 
prescriptions, not its prescriptions about the overall line of march for 
working-class revolution against capitalism, a grand strategy that was in its 
essentials already articulated by Marx and Engels (1848). The six (largely 
organizational) strategic principles that comprise the most distinctive and 
controversial elements of Lenin’s first-order strategy are as follows: 
 
1. First, that the organizational form of the political party should be 
the central vehicle for leading the anti-capitalist movement, rather 
than, say, unions or cooperatives, as proposed by some syndicalists, 
anarchists and others (Lenin 1920b). 
2. Second, that the party should be a party of the most advanced 
activists in the workers’ movement, rather than a party of the 
working class as a whole, contrary to the views of radical social 
democrats in our contemporary sense (Lenin 1904). 
3. Third, that the party should be centralist in matters of practical 
policy, not pluralist (Lenin 1921). 
4. Fourth, that the party’s centralism should be regulated by a 
command-and-control hierarchy of party governance, with lower 
level bodies acting under the direction of higher level bodies (Lenin 
1904).  
5. Fifth, that the party should try to participate in and exert influence 
on mass organizations of the workers’ movement (such as unions 
and cooperatives), rather than to construct revolutionary 
alternatives to those organizations (Lenin 1920a). 
6. And, finally, sixth, that the party’s work ought to be integrated into, 
and ideally coordinated directly with, a wider process of global anti-
capitalist revolution, in the form of organized and disciplined 
internationalism, of the sort typified by the early Communist 
International (Lenin 1920d). 
 
This, I take it, comprises the core of Lenin’s first-order revolutionary 
strategy. These six principles (joined to the grand strategy sketched above) 
are enough to bring into focus the outlines of Lenin’s strategy, with its 
familiar picture of a global workers’ movement led by its so-called 
vanguard of radical activists, who are organized into a democratic 
centralist party, disciplined internally, but also internationally, by the norm 
of unity in action. This is ‘Leninism.’ 
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And yet, there is more to Lenin’s overall strategic framework than 
can be gleaned directly from this first-order strategy. And our reception of 
first-order Leninism ought to be informed by an appreciation of Lenin’s 
thinking on strategy choice and strategy development, that is, by an 
appreciation of his second-order meta-strategy. 
For my purposes, five of Lenin’s meta-strategic principles stand out 
as especially important. 
 
1. First, that the criterion of soundness in matters of strategy is not 
epistemic correctness (truth), but pragmatic efficacy (Lenin 1906). 
2. Second, that pragmatic soundness is always context-relative, in the 
sense that a strategy that is sound in one context may be unsound in 
another (Lenin 1906). 
3. Third, that the crucial contextual variable in assessing revolutionary 
strategies is, precisely, the balance of forces between the contending 
classes and their allied social forces (Lenin 1910). 
4. Fourth, that as long as the balance of forces favours the ruling class 
and its allied social forces, the revolutionary struggle must be 
preparatory in nature, and hence protracted and asymmetrical, but 
as soon as the balance of forces favours the oppositional class and 
its allied forces, so that a rapid and fundamental strategic reversal 
seems possible, the struggle passes from a preparatory into a critical 
phase (Lenin 1910).  
5. Fifth, that the strategic orientation appropriate to protracted and 
asymmetrical struggle, that is, to the preparatory phase of anti-
capitalist struggle, is that of an attrition strategy, whereas the 
strategic orientation appropriate to the critical phase of anti-
capitalist struggle is that of an overthrow strategy (Lenin 1910). 
 
I take it that some of these points are self-evident, and require no special 
comment, notably the first three of Lenin’s second-order principles, which 
jointly constitute a doctrine that we may call ‘strategic contextualism’: that 
strategies are neither true nor false, but only effective or ineffective; that 
effectiveness depends crucially on socio-political context; and that the 
decisive feature of the social context is the balance of power between the 
ruling class and the exploited and oppressed masses. But some of Lenin’s 
meta-strategic principles make reference to political debates and strategic 
concepts that are less well-known, notably the distinction between 
preparatory and crisis phases of the anti-capitalist struggle and the further 
and related distinction between attrition and overthrow strategies. 
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Attrition and Overthrow 
Lenin’s distinction between ‘attrition’ and ‘overthrow’ originated in the 
discourse of the German military historian Hans Delbrück (1848-1929). 
According to Delbrück, a strategy of overthrow (Niederwerfungsstrategie) 
proceeds by seeking out opportunities to confront the enemy directly in 
order to defeat it in decisive battles by overpowering its capacity to resist. 
A strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie), by contrast, attempts to avoid 
or delay such decisive battles, usually because these cannot yet be won, 
and seeks instead to exploit every opportunity to strengthen the forces of 
the weaker side and to weaken those of their stronger enemy (Craig 1986). 
These terms, and the contrast between them, were borrowed from 
Delbrück and introduced into debates about socialist strategy by Karl 
Kautsky in 1910. Kautsky explained the distinction as follows: 
Modern military science [viz., Delbrück] distinguishes between two kinds of 
strategy: the strategy of overthrow and the strategy of attrition. The former 
draws its forces rapidly together in order to go to meet the enemy and to deal 
decisive blows by means of which the enemy is overthrown and rendered 
incapable of struggle. In the attrition strategy, the commander-in-chief initially 
avoids any decisive battle; he aims to keep the opposing army on the move by 
all sorts of manoeuvres, without giving it the opportunity of raising the morale 
of its troops by gaining victories; he strives to gradually wear them out by 
continual exhaustion and threats and to consistently reduce their resistance 
and paralyse them. (Kautsky 1910, 54) 
The occasion for Kautsky’s introduction of the attrition/overthrow 
distinction was a debate between himself and Rosa Luxemburg, over how 
best to advance the aim of winning universal suffrage across Germany 
(Anderson 1976; Kautsky 1910; Luxemburg 1910). Luxemburg’s favoured 
strategy, informed by the experience of the 1905 revolutionary movement 
in Russia, relied crucially on the use of militant mass strikes. In Kautsky’s 
view, such a course of action would have been ‘imprudent’ (Kautsky 1910, 
70), because Luxemburg’s supposed ‘overthrow’ approach risked 
provoking a wave of state repression and anti-socialist legislation, in a 
context in which the radical Left might be unable to prevail. As a result, he 
argued, Luxemburg’s strategy would have squandered the considerable 
gains that had been made over the years by the German Left. ‘The worst 
defeat would be…if we summoned the proletariat to the political mass 
strike and it did not respond to the appeal by an overwhelming majority,’ 
Kautsky argued. ‘We would nip in the bud all the promising seeds being 
nurtured in the coming Reichstag elections if, without it being necessary, 
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we provoked struggles which brought us heavy defeats…. Today our 
agitation must escalate not towards the mass strike, but towards the 
coming Reichstag elections’ (Kautsky 1910, 71). Thus, the term ‘attrition’ 
was first introduced into strategy debates on the Left in order to justify a 
rejection of militancy in favour of a passive, electoralist strategy,2 like that 
proposed by Kautsky.  
In spite of this inauspicious introduction of Delbrück’s vocabulary 
into strategy debates on the Left, Lenin cites the distinction approvingly 
later in that same year, in his article, ‘The Historical Meaning of the Inner-
Party Struggle’ (Lenin 1910). Lenin’s purpose, we should note, is not to 
intervene into the strategy quarrel in Germany. Rather, as the context 
makes clear, Lenin’s aim is only to chastise the Menshevik Julius Martov for 
misappropriating Kautsky’s notion of attrition in the context of Russian 
debates about the 1905 revolt in Russia. It is quite correct to deploy the 
notion of attrition, Lenin suggests, but Kautsky rightly saw attrition 
strategies as appropriate only for preparatory phases of the struggle, when 
power asymmetries were to the great disadvantage of anti-capitalists. By 
contrast, Lenin says, ‘Martov … advocated the ‘strategy of attrition’ for the 
period when the revolution reached its highest intensity’ (Lenin 1910, 
383).  
 At this point, therefore, some caution is called for, to avoid a 
misreading of Lenin. True, Lenin endorses Kautsky’s embrace of Delbrück’s 
attrition/overthrow distinction. Moreover, Lenin also endorses Kautsky’s 
insistence (in Kautsky 1910) that the anti-capitalist Left is not to choose 
between these strategic frameworks, but rather to sequence them correctly, 
switching from attrition to overthrow strategies when the preparatory 
phase gives way to a social crisis, opening up a path toward possible 
victory for the anti-capitalist Left (Lenin 1910). On these points, which are 
what I am calling meta-strategic points, Lenin follows Kautsky no less 
closely than Gramsci would go on to do some years later, in his prison 
notebooks (Gramsci 1971, 242-43 and throughout), where one of 
Delbrück’s other names for attrition, ‘war of position’ (Stellungskrieg; see 
                                                 
2
 Note that Kautsky advocates electoralism as a strategy, not simply electioneering as a tactic: 
‘Our opponents are already reckoning with the possibility,’ Kautsky said against Luxemburg, 
‘that in the coming election we will get 125 seats” (1910: 66). ‘I have no doubt at all,’ he 
added, ‘that the next elections will shake this system to its foundations’ (1910: 70). He was 
convinced ‘that the earliest conceivable opportunity of inflicting a shattering blow to the worst 
enemies of the people, is the coming Reichstag elections; and that we should summon and 
rally all our forces for this end’ (1910: 72). 
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Delbrück 1918), is counterposed to ‘war of maneuvre’ 3 in a manner that 
follows Kautsky’s text very closely indeed4 (Anderson 1976, 61-63). 
However, it would be wrong to jump to the further conclusion that Lenin 
would have endorsed – or that he actually did endorse – Kautsky’s call for 
an attrition strategy in opposition to the overthrow stance of Luxemburg, 
in the context of the German debate. What we need to see here is that the 
case that Lenin makes against Martov – precisely when he embraces the 
attrition/overthrow contrast – is the very same case that Luxemburg 
makes against Kautsky. Luxemburg’s hostility to Kautsky’s call for an 
attrition strategy is, quite explicitly, bound up with an analysis of the 
balance of social power in the historical context of 1910 Germany. What 
Luxemburg says against Kautsky, and what Lenin says against Martov, is 
                                                 
3
 It should be pointed out that Gramsci’s introduction of ‘war of manoeuvre’ as a name for the 
strategy of overthrow is potentially a source of confusion, because it exacerbates the 
likelihood that readers will confuse Kautsky’s and Lenin’s contrast between attrition strategies 
and overthrow strategies with the similar-sounding but actually very different contrast 
between ‘wars of attrition’ and ‘wars of manoeuvre’ as these terms are used by many 
contemporary military strategists (see Mearsheimer 1981/82; and Lind 1979). The trench 
warfare so typical of World War I exemplified the strategy of overthrow, not attrition, in 
Delbrück’s sense, because each side sought to directly confront its adversary in order to 
overpower it. Yet, in the distinctly non-Delbrückian idiom of contemporary military strategists, 
World War I was a ‘war of attrition.’ To writers like Mearsheimer and Lind, a ‘war of attrition’ 
is – like Delbrück's strategy of overthrow – primarily focused on seeking out and conducting 
decisive battles, in a mutual test of strength. When they say ‘war of manoeuvre,’ on the other 
hand, they have in mind attempts to use bold and unexpected movements to strike suddenly 
at an adversary's ‘Achilles heel,’ leading to a rapid breakdown of the enemy’s morale and 
system of command and control. Nevertheless, because the strategic discourse of the socialist 
Left has been shaped mainly by the usage familiar from writings by people like Kautsky, 
Gramsci, Luxemburg and Lenin, in this article I retain their Delbrückian vocabulary. 
4
 Strangely, Anderson contends that Gramsci’s recapitulation of Kautsky’s attrition/overthrow 
argument was a mere ‘coincidence,’ albeit an ‘arresting’ and ‘disconcerting’ coincidence (61-
62). But this is by no means plausible. As Anderson himself points out, Gramsci’s 
postion/manoeuvre contrast is not only formally analogous to Kautsky’s attrition/overthrow 
contrast, but ‘Kautsky evoked precisely the same historical and geographical contrasts as 
Gramsci was to do in his discussion of war of position and war of manoeuvre’ (Anderson 1976, 
62). It is perhaps not inconceivable that Gramsci – who was known to be an afficionado of 
strategy debates – was somehow unfamiliar with the Kautsky/Luxemburg debate over mass 
strikes (or Lenin’s response to it in Lenin 1910). However, the burden of proof surely falls on 
anyone who, like Anderson, wants to claim that the arresting coincidence is indeed a mere 
coincidence, rather than (as seems more likely) a case of Gramsci simply adopting a view that 
had been popularized on the European Left by Kautsky and, within limits, endorsed by Lenin. 
Anderson does nothing to meet that burden of proof except simply to assert that, ‘unknown 
to himself, Gramsci had an illustrious predecessor’ in Kautsky (Anderson 1976, 61). 
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that a sound meta-strategic principle – namely, that in the context of 
protracted, asymmetrical struggles against stronger adversaries an 
attrition strategy should be favoured over an overthrow strategy – is 
misappropriated by being pressed into service to defend a wrong-headed 
first-order strategy.5 Lenin and Luxemburg agree with Martov and Kautsky 
at the level of meta-strategy, but disagree at the level of strategy. And they 
disagree with the strategy primarily because the context is, in each case, 
not a context in which an unfavourable balance of power necessitates a 
protracted asymmetrical struggle against an adversary that is too strong to 
confront head-on. In both Lenin’s reply to Martov (Lenin 1910) and 
Luxemburg’s reply to Kautsky (Luxemburg 1910, part 2), the authors 
introduce evidence, such as strike levels and other data, to demonstrate 
that the workers’ movement is stronger, and the ruling class is weaker, 
than Martov and Kautsky have suggested.  
 Moreover, it would also be a mistake to assume that, because Lenin 
endorsed the meta-strategic principle that attrition strategies are called for 
in prolonged non-revolutionary periods, he must have agreed with 
Kautsky’s apparent assumption that an attrition strategy for the Left will 
be an electoralist one. In fact, agreement on meta-strategy does not imply 
agreement on first-order strategy: Lenin had a very different perspective 
on the place of electoral tactics in strategic planning for non-revolutionary 
periods and at no time did he endorse an electoralist strategy for any 
country, although he certainly favoured participation in elections as a 
tactic in many cases (Lenin 1920a). 
 
Lenin’s Meta-strategy versus Lenin’s Strategy 
What conclusions can we draw from the fact that Lenin embraced meta-
strategic principles quite close to those embraced by Kautsky and Martov? 
For one thing, this suggests that Lenin’s commitment to first-order 
Leninism is not a function of supposedly timeless truths about how to 
maximize the effectiveness of anti-capitalist resistance. There are those 
(for example, Harnecker 2009) who deduce the core elements of first-
order Leninism from such timeless premises as the claim that 
institutionalized unity-in-action is more effective than strategic dispersal, 
                                                 
5
 Contrary to the suggestion of Anderson (1976), Luxemburg’s evident resistance to Kautsky’s 
use of Delbrück is not a rejection in principle of the attrition/overthrow distinction, but a 
rejection of its relevance to the contrast Kautsky draws between Russian and German 
conditions, a contrast that she depicts as simplistic and wrong-headed (see Luxemburg 1910). 
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in multiple programmatically differentiated organizations, even when that 
differentiation is consistent with tactical concentration in united-front type 
activity. Arguably, that is not true as a generalization about effective 
political organizing. But in any case, it is not the basis for Lenin’s first-
order strategy. On the contrary, Lenin hinges his case for first-order 
Leninism on its sensitivity to the demands of a particular context, namely, 
as he puts it against Martov, ‘the period when the revolution reached its 
highest intensity.’ More broadly, it is a strategy appropriate to what he 
calls ‘an epoch of wars and revolutions’ (Lenin 1916, 283), that is, a period 
of generalized social crisis, either underway or on the immediate horizon.6 
 The key point that I want to insist on is that Lenin’s own mature 
strategic proposal, first-order Leninism, as codified in the early congresses 
of the Communist International, was an overthrow strategy which, by 
Lenin’s own meta-strategic standards, ought to be suspended in contexts of 
protracted, asymmetrical struggle against a ruling class that is much more 
well-positioned strategically than the forces of the anti-capitalist 
opposition. In the latter circumstances, an attrition strategy is more 
suitable. Because it is clear, at least in reference to today’s North America, 
that the balance of forces between the contending classes makes revolution 
an unlikely outcome in the foreseeable future, it is equally clear that 
Lenin’s second-order strategic principles jointly imply, in the context of 
contemporary North American anti-capitalist activism, a strong case in 
favour of rejecting an overthrow strategy (such as first-order Leninism) 
and adopting instead an attrition strategy. In particular, several of Lenin’s 
first-order principles – namely, the first, third, fourth, and sixth – have little 
                                                 
6
 By ‘crisis,’ in this context, I do not mean just any sort of crisis, such as a constitutional crisis 
or an economic crisis (although these can play a role as elements of a crisis in the present 
sense). Rather, I mean specifically the ‘crisis phase of the anti-capitalist struggle,’ which is to 
say any period in the history of a revolutionary movement in which the realistic possibility of 
actually carrying out revolution, as opposed to preparing for it, is on the historical agenda. Of 
course, even this notion is too vague to capture Lenin’s thinking on this matter, because Lenin 
actually distinguishes between ‘revolutionary periods,’ such as the European epoch of wars 
and revolutions before, during and after World War I, and ‘revolutionary situations,’ in which 
the historical tasks of the ‘crisis phase’ become immediate requirements. These concepts are 
discussed in ‘The Collapse of the Second International’ (Lenin 1915): on ‘revolutionary 
periods,’ see 247; on ‘revolutionary situations,’ see 228. In a revolutionary period the task is to 
prepare for a revolutionary situation. The latter may only obtain for ‘days,’ according to Lenin 
(270). ‘History places this form of struggle on the order of the day very infrequently,’ he says. 
But ‘it will demand arduous preparatory activities’ (270). An overthrow strategy is called for in 
revolutionary periods, precisely because in such periods it is necessary to prepare for a 
revolutionary situation, which is not the case during non-revolutionary periods. 
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or no strategically sound application under circumstances where a first-
order strategy of attrition is called for. This is especially so under 
circumstances of legality (low levels of anti-radical repression). 
 Consider the first principle, that the political party is the central 
vehicle for leading the anti-capitalist movement. The whole conception of a 
‘political party’ that Lenin takes for granted – whether he depicts as his 
paradigm case the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the 
decades immediately prior to World War I or the Russian Communist Party 
after 1917 – presupposes that the party will be a mass organization, with 
real influence among millions of members of the working class. But a 
‘micro-party’ of only a few hundred or a even a few thousand members will 
remain quite marginal to the many millions of workers in most countries. It 
is, therefore, a phenomenon of an entirely different type. Whatever the real 
or imaginary merits of micro-parties, it is clear that they have nothing to do 
with Lenin’s notion of the Party as a vehicle for ‘advanced workers’ (i.e. 
militant workers, influenced by radical politics) to play a leadership role 
vis-à-vis the wider working class. So, in a context like that of present-day 
North America, in which no revolutionary ‘party’ that is more than a 
‘micro-party’ has existed for many decades, this first principle of Lenin’s 
first-order strategy has no application. Such a party cannot exist today or 
in the currently foreseeable future. Consider, too, the third and fourth 
principles, that a revolutionary organization should be centralist in two 
senses: ‘non-pluralist’ in matters of practical policy or program, and 
regulated by a command-and-control hierarchy of governance wherein 
lower-level bodies act under the direction of higher-level bodies. The 
rationale for these principles – which (together with a commitment to 
democratic decision-making after thorough discussion) jointly constitute 
the core of the complex notion of ‘democratic centralism’ – was always 
bound up, in Lenin’s strategic thought, with strategic contextualism. It was 
the context – an ‘epoch of wars and revolutions,’ or what Lukács (1971) 
called ‘the actuality of the revolution’ – that made this kind of disciplined 
unity in action necessary. Disciplined centralism reflected the constraints 
associated with a life-and-death struggle against the ruling class and its 
political representatives. But under circumstances of legality (i.e. relatively 
mild political repression of radicals) and asymmetry (i.e. a weak Left 
confronting a powerful and entrenched ruling class) these constraints do 
not seem to hold. Indeed, by cultivating authoritarian personality traits 
among some activists, they may have the perverse effect over time of 
weakening the radical and militant impulses of revolutionary activists and 
creating a psycho-social ‘disconnect’ between revolutionaries and the 
Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 5(2): 64-89 
76 
wider working class. Consider, finally, the sixth of Lenin’s first-order 
strategic principles, that the political conduct of revolutionary 
organizations in each country should be disciplined by a global 
coordinating body of the sort typified by the Comintern. This principle, too, 
is without application in a context in which the global radical Left, to say 
nothing of the North American radical Left, is far too weak to organize an 
‘International’ of the sort represented by the Second and Third 
Internationals in Lenin’s time. These Internationals brought together 
delegates from socialist mass parties in several countries. Nothing of that 
sort exists right now, and there is no reason to suppose that 
revolutionaries in North America have any sound reason to incorporate 
this notion – which was indeed relevant to radicals in Lenin’s time – into 
their political strategy today. 
 It seems clear, therefore, that Lenin’s first-order strategy has no 
application in contemporary North America, and we owe this insight to 
Lenin’s own meta-strategic contextualism. As a matter of historical fact, 
after all, first-order Leninism proceeded from the assumption of the 
‘actuality of the revolution’ (Lukács 1971), that is, the assumption that the 
anti-capitalist movement is operating in an ‘epoch of wars and revolutions’ 
(Lenin 1916). In contemporary North America, by contrast, a very different 
strategy is required: a strategy of anti-capitalist attrition. But, as always, 
meta-strategic principles of this kind imply no determinate directives on 
matters of first-order strategy. We can see clearly that a ‘Leninesque’ meta-
strategy implies that we should embrace an attrition strategy of some sort. 
But what sort of attrition strategy, exactly? What might a first-order 
strategy of anti-capitalist attrition look like, grounded in a Leninesque, and 
therefore also a Kautskyist and Martovian, meta-strategy, applied to 
contemporary North American conditions? 
 
Anti-Capitalist Attrition: Revolutionary Strategy in a Non-revolutionary 
Period 
There is, to be sure, something paradoxical about the task of formulating a 
revolutionary strategy for a non-revolutionary period. Intuitively, we 
expect that a revolutionary strategy will define success as the carrying out 
of a revolutionary transformation of society. But an attrition strategy – at 
least as Lenin understood it – starts out with the assumption that carrying 
out an actual revolution is not on the immediate agenda for anti-capitalist 
activists. In today’s North America, there is no mistaking the predicament 
of those who aim to overturn the power of big business and to establish a 
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radically democratic alternative to capitalism: the forces of the radical Left 
are in disarray, whereas the strength and confidence of the ruling class, 
though shaken by recent events (namely, the financial and macroeconomic 
crises of 2008-09), remain formidable indeed by comparison. The 
asymmetry between the power of an entrenched ruling class and the 
relative weakness of the anti-capitalist opposition poses a more modest, 
but equally challenging task: to develop a strategy for reversing this 
unfavourable balance of forces, to the advantage of the radical Left, so that 
the more ambitious project of attempting the ‘overthrow’ of capitalist rule 
can once again be taken up by anti-capitalists.  
Obviously, the meta-strategically motivated decision to ‘hold off’ on 
pursuing an overthrow strategy has little in common with the position of 
those who regard the prospects for anti-capitalist revolution as so bleak 
that there is no point in pursuing revolutionary activism in this period. On 
the contrary, a strategy of anti-capitalist attrition is, precisely, a guide for 
conducting political action today with a view to laying the foundation for a 
revolutionary transformation in the future. Such a strategy will propose a 
set of strategic objectives, not on the grounds that revolution is impossible, 
but on the grounds that attaining these objectives will in fact open up a 
pathway toward a revival and reinvigoration of the revolutionary project. 
It is for this reason that an anti-capitalist attrition strategy, in the context 
of an asymmetrical and protracted struggle against an entrenched ruling 
class, is indeed a revolutionary strategy, even if it is not an overthrow 
strategy.7 
Today’s revolutionaries need an attrition strategy because they 
need to rebuild the radical Left, to revive the socialist project, to renew the 
movement to dismantle capitalism and replace it with a radically 
egalitarian, post-capitalist economic democracy. Today’s tasks, in other 
words, are preparatory in nature. A strategy of anti-capitalist attrition can 
serve as a guide to this kind of preparatory revolutionary activism, offering 
activists a much-needed sense of orientation in strategic space: a 
framework for setting goals, developing tactics, choosing allies, assessing 
the movement’s strengths and weaknesses, and identifying the period’s 
dangers and opportunities. 
                                                 
7
 As discussed in above, to the extent that Kautsky and Martov advocated attrition strategies – 
indeed, narrowly electoralist ones at that – in a context in which ‘the revolution reached its 
highest intensity,’ they were in fact disavowing the whole idea of transitioning from an 
attrition strategy into an overthrow strategy in the context of a revolutionary period. In that 
sense, these were clearly not revolutionary strategies, except in name. 
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How, then, might North American revolutionaries proceed in the 
contemporary context? What kind of strategic objectives could they pursue 
in the hope of reversing today’s unfavourable balance of forces? 
Before identifying a set of objectives, it is necessary to take stock of 
just what we mean when we talk about a ‘powerful’ and ‘entrenched’ ruling 
class and a “weak” radical Left. Successfully identifying the sources of this 
imbalance should make it easier to identify the changes that would have to 
be brought about in order to achieve the core aim of any attrition strategy 
– to strengthen the weaker side and weaken the stronger side in an 
asymmetrical conflict. 
I suggest that the strength of the North American ruling class, and 
the weakness of its anti-capitalist opposition, is rooted in four key features 
of the contemporary situation. First, we are living in a time of relative social 
stability, rather than a time of great upheaval and unrest, and this has been 
so for decades. That is not to say that there is no class conflict or significant 
social protest. Nor is it to deny the obvious economic dislocations and 
crises that continue to plague capitalism everywhere, indeed seldom more 
so than in the past couple of years. It is simply to take note of the obvious: 
that this is not a time of great social unrest and upheaval in North America. 
Second, the historical alternatives to capitalism are widely held to have been 
discredited, largely because the only two such alternatives that have been 
broadly acknowledged – welfare-state expansionism and bureaucratic 
command planning – have both fallen into a mostly-deserved state of 
broad disrepute (D’Arcy 2009). Third, the declining strength of the trade 
union movement, especially the private sector industrial unions, has meant 
that there is no united, organized social force that seems ready and able to 
challenge corporate power and fight for an alternative. And finally, fourth, 
the main historically important currents of anti-capitalist radicalism, such 
as anarchism and Marxism, that once exercised such a profound influence 
on masses of working-class activists, have in recent decades become 
almost entirely marginal to public political discourse in North America. 
This marginalization of anti-capitalist political currents has had the effect of 
allowing the ideology of capitalism’s elites to go largely unchallenged by 
any coherent, visible, and credible alternative. 
If these four circumstances are the sources of capitalism’s strength 
in contemporary North America, then we know what anti-capitalists 
pursuing an attrition strategy will have to try to do. First, faced with levels 
of social upheaval and confrontational protest that are too low to pose the 
kinds of questions to which political radicalism purports to offer answers, 
today’s anti-capitalists will have to destabilize the political order by 
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fomenting sustained civil unrest. Second, faced with the discrediting of the 
leading historical alternatives to capitalism (namely, welfare-state 
expansionism and bureaucratic planning), anti-capitalist activists will have 
to construct prefigurative forms of egalitarian economic democracy, 
modelling sustainability and social justice, in order thereby to revive the 
lost sense of optimism about the viability and appeal of post-capitalist 
alternatives. Third, faced with the lack of a social force capable of 
confronting and challenging capitalism’s ruling class and its underlings in 
government, anti-capitalists will have to construct an anti-corporate 
alliance of labour and community organizations, with the potential over 
the long run to contest the dominance and hegemony of big business. 
Finally, fourth, faced with the ideological marginalization of leftist 
challenges to capitalism, today’s radicals will have to re-establish vital 
currents of anti-capitalist radicalism, and to begin to regain a capacity to 
exercise significant influence on activists on the broader Left, with the aim 
of re-inserting anti-capitalist ideas into the public sphere as a source of 
dissident analysis, vision and strategy. 
Were anti-capitalist activists to succeed in carrying out these tasks, 
the resulting shift in the balance of forces between defenders and 
opponents of the capitalist system would be remarkable: it would signal 
the emergence of a strong Left, and an undermined, weakened ruling class. 
An anti-capitalist attrition strategy for North America under contemporary 
conditions, therefore, should aim to achieve these four strategic objectives: 
(1) fomenting civil unrest; (2) building prefigurative, non-capitalist 
alternatives; (3) constructing an anti-corporate alliance; and (4) re-
establishing vital currents of anti-capitalist radicalism. 
Enumerating these tasks is obviously easier than carrying them out, 
but anti-capitalists are by no means lacking in fruitful paths to follow with 
the aim of making real progress on these tasks. I will take up each in turn. 
 
Fomenting Civil Unrest 
Protest is at the heart of radical politics. The vitality of the Left relies 
crucially on the existence of powerful mass protest movements, which 
draw people into oppositional political activity, expose them to critical 
insights about how social institutions work, and in many cases transform 
their understanding of the prospects for participating directly in shaping 
the course of events by organizing resistance collectively with their 
neighbours, co-workers and allies. This relationship between the 
dynamism of the Left and the vitality of mass protest movements makes 
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the decline of social protest in recent decades all the more troubling. 
Clearly an attrition strategy must address this problem. 
Fortunately, anti-capitalist activists on the whole know better than 
most political activists how to foment civil unrest. After all, radicals have 
always played a leading role in fostering the development of militant mass 
mobilizations in which exploited and oppressed people take action to 
demand redress for their grievances. In recent years, too, anti-capitalists 
have had considerable success building grassroots protest movements by 
adopting the approach of combining strategic dispersal with tactical 
concentration. This was illustrated vividly in the organizing for the Seattle 
protest against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 1999. 
Strategic dispersal means cultivating the development of a pluralistic Left, 
comprised of multiple organizations, pursuing diverse agendas, favouring a 
wide range of tactics and organizing methods, and focusing on 
differentiated constituencies or audiences. Tactical concentration, on the 
other hand, means cultivating the capacity of this plurality of highly 
differentiated organizations and projects to engage in timely tactical 
convergence, uniting for coordinated action to advance an agreed upon aim 
in agreed upon ways at an agreed upon time and place. The global justice 
mass protests in cities like Seattle, Quebéc City, Washington, DC, Prague, 
and so on, in the period 1999-2001, all exemplified this approach.  
And yet, even these successes have been fleeting and difficult to 
sustain. Building mass demonstrations is one thing; building and sustaining 
mass protest movements is something rather more difficult. Nevertheless, a 
resurgence of mass protest movements is a necessary condition for the 
revival of the prospects for a renewed revolutionary movement. If the Left 
has so far failed to achieve this resurgence, it is not because anti-capitalists 
do not know how to do it. After all, in 1999-2001, the Left was building the 
beginnings of a militant mass protest movement demanding global justice 
and opposing neo-liberalism. The emerging movement was derailed and 
disoriented by the events of 11 September 2001, but this could hardly have 
been predicted or avoided by the Left. Again, in late 2002 and early 2003, 
the scattered remnants of the global justice movement reconstituted 
themselves as a mass anti-war movement, which mobilized millions in an 
attempt to prevent the invasion of Iraq (D’Arcy 2008). In this case, the 
movement was derailed, not by an external shock, but by its inability to 
secure any unambiguous victories, a failure which dashed the hopes of 
many participants and took the steam out of the emerging movement. It is 
clear that a mass protest movement cannot be built without a string of 
victories to boost the confidence and sense of efficacy among organizers 
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and actual or potential participants. But, notwithstanding their obvious 
limitations, both of these experiences with nascent mass movement-
building in recent years should be seen as confirming that grassroots 
popular mobilization can be effective at politicizing millions of people and 
sparking a resurgence of mass protest movements. To be sure, there is no 
guarantee of success in these efforts. But neither is there any reason to 
doubt the possibility of success. 
 
Building Prefigurative, Non-capitalist Alternatives 
There is more to the Left than protest, of course. The Left has always 
aspired to point out a path toward a different kind of society: an egalitarian 
post-capitalist economy. We know, however, that the vision of a post-
capitalist, socialist political and economic alternative to capitalism suffers 
from a crisis of credibility. There are some people who reject the idea of a 
socialist alternative because they regard it as fatally unworkable. But far 
more people reject socialism because they regard it as fundamentally 
unappealing. The experience of the social-democratic ‘road’ has given 
people an ample opportunity to experience the fruits of welfare-state 
expansionism. But, whatever the accomplishments of the bureaucratic 
welfare state, few people have found themselves drawn to it as an inspiring 
ideal of human liberation. The ‘East European’ model has been, if anything, 
still less inspiring than the welfare-state capitalism of the social-democrats. 
For these reasons, there can be little reason to expect a resurgence of the 
revolutionary anti-capitalist project unless radicals can develop a 
compelling case for the appeal of an egalitarian post-capitalist economy. 
But doing so will require going beyond rearticulating the familiar ideals of 
equality and democracy. It is necessary to take the further step of drawing 
masses of people into actually existing, and actually appealing, alternative 
economies. This means taking very seriously the task of building up the so-
called ‘social economy’: workers’ co-operatives, consumer and housing co-
operatives, experiments in ‘participatory economics,’ small-scale barter 
economies, and other forms of democratic and egalitarian economic 
activity operating in the margins and interstices of contemporary 
capitalism (Gibson-Graham 2006). Marx rightly saw in co-operatives the 
seeds of a new, radically democratic and egalitarian alternative to 
capitalism (Marx 1894, Chapter 27), yet many self-described ‘Marxists’ pay 
almost no attention to the co-operative movement. The radical Left in the 
twentieth century, frankly, made a disastrous decision to drop its earlier 
commitment to co-operatives in favour of a bureaucratic-statist 
reinterpretation of the socialist ideal. A revitalized Left will have to do a 
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much better job at promoting co-operatives and other prefigurative forms 
of economic democracy as living illustrations of the appeal of community-
based alternatives to profit-motivated market economics. 
Though urgently necessary, such a renewal of the Left’s 
commitment to co-operatives and other prefigurative, anti-capitalist 
economic forms will not be sufficient to revive the credibility of a socialist 
alternative to capitalism. Just as important is the building of an alternative 
politics. In the short term, that means systematically encouraging the 
development of an oppositional rather than an integrative politics: a 
channelling of popular political engagement away from the ‘official’ forms 
of political participation within the framework of the capitalist state, such 
as voting or joining electoralist parties, into specifically extra-
parliamentary modes of civic engagement, notably protest movement 
activism and other forms of grassroots, community-based civic activism. In 
the long term, though, building an alternative politics will mean fostering 
the re-emergence of counter-capitalist, parallel political institutions 
beyond the control of capital and the state, such as popular assemblies or 
community councils. This has been a hallmark of mass radicalizations for 
decades, as we have seen in so many of the major social upheavals of 
modern times (Gluckstein 1985; Barker 1987). Just as co-operatives and 
experiments in participatory economics can anticipate or prefigure 
possibilities for post-capitalist economic institutions and practices, so too 
can these community councils and assemblies anticipate participatory-
democratic modes of civic engagement in public policy-making in a post-
capitalist context. 
 
Constructing an Anti-corporate Alliance 
Once again, there is no particular mystery about how to pursue the third 
strategic objective of the attrition strategy proposed here: constructing an 
anti-corporate alliance that is capable of posing a real threat to capitalism.  
North American anti-capitalist activists are now a politically 
marginal and numerically tiny force. Yet the viability of their project 
depends on the participation of many millions of people. How can the 
radical Left link up its ambitious, transformative agenda with broad and 
politically efficacious forces capable (in the long run) of rivalling the 
economic power of big business and the political power of the capitalist 
state? Here a resurgent radical Left should embrace the good judgment of 
its earlier incarnations: the Left has traditionally identified as its potential 
base of mass support a broad sector of the public, consisting of the 
membership of working-class organizations, classically including unions 
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and co-operatives but also encompassing other forms of working-class self-
organization, and their ‘natural allies’ in those democratic and egalitarian 
community organizations working within civil society to achieve social and 
environmental justice, and political and economic democracy: feminists, 
anti-racists, environmentalists, disability-rights activists, and so on. This 
simply restates, in a contemporary idiom, the core of the ‘grand-strategic 
line of march’ that Lenin embraced and that I recounted above. This 
constituency has the two advantages of being both potentially receptive to 
anti-capitalist (or at least anti-corporate) politics, and potentially powerful 
in the threat that it can pose to the status quo. Unfortunately, the actual 
receptivity of that audience to anti-capitalist politics and the actual threat 
it poses to the status quo, fall far short of its potential in these respects. 
This, of course, is a problem with which ‘Western Marxists’ have been 
trying to grapple for many decades. My response to this set of problems is 
captured by the cumulative content of my comments on the first, second, 
and fourth strategic objectives of the anti-capitalist attrition strategy 
proposed in this paper (about fomenting civil unrest, building counter-
capitalist alternatives, and re-establishing vital currents of anti-capitalist 
radicalism). The constituency in question – working-class organizations 
and community-based social and environmental justice organizations – is 
no doubt demobilized and demoralized, but its resurgence represents the 
only hope for a transformative political project based upon the self-
organization of exploited and oppressed people. So, whatever the 
difficulties, what anti-capitalists need to do is mobilize this constituency to 
build a powerful anti-corporate alliance of labour and community 
organizations.  
It seems clear that such a labour/community alliance is necessary 
for a revival of the anti-capitalist project. But what, tactically speaking, can 
anti-capitalists do to build it? We can think of this in terms of the need to 
foster a double transformation: unions and other working-class 
organizations have to move in the direction of deeper and more consistent 
forms of solidarity with the wider circle of community-based movement 
activism within civil society; and these non-labour community 
organizations need to reject alliances with big business and its political 
representatives, and to embrace instead a consistently anti-corporate, pro-
worker political analysis and strategy. Within the labour movement, this 
means that anti-capitalists need to challenge every manifestation of 
narrowly economic ‘business unionism’ by organizing at the rank and file 
level within unions for a ‘solidarity’ or ‘social movement’ approach to 
unionism, which besides focusing on bargaining for wages and benefits 
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also gives priority to the promotion of a broader political agenda for 
democratizing the economy, and for promoting social movements against 
racism, sexism, poverty and environmental destruction. Conversely, within 
the wider civil society social movements, activists pursuing anti-capitalist 
attrition need to promote a consistently anti-corporate, pro-worker 
consciousness, as an indispensable element of Left politics generally. Thus, 
for example, they need to make the case for specifically class-struggle 
(militantly anti-corporate) forms of feminism, anti-racism, 
environmentalism, and so on. Doing so will sharpen the antagonism that 
divides participants in these movements from the economic and political 
elites of capitalism. But it will also enhance their capacity to win real gains 
by encouraging the development of a powerful strategic alliance with the 
workers’ movement at the grassroots level. 
 
Re-establishing Vital Currents of Anti-capitalist Radicalism 
I argued above that, in a preparatory period, when revolutionary politics 
has little influence on the vast majority of working-class people, it makes 
no sense to think that ‘the role of the party’ sketched by Lenin (1920b) has 
any contemporary relevance. There are no masses of radical workers to 
organize into a party of the ‘advanced workers’ (or ‘vanguard of the 
working class’). So there is no party to build. Nevertheless, the fourth 
strategic objective of re-establishing vital currents of anti-capitalist 
radicalism, as sources of radical analysis, strategy, and vision, is at all times 
of crucial importance. The question is, how do we advance that aim in the 
present context?  
First, anti-capitalists, starting from their position at the margins of 
public discourse, need to develop a voice: a capacity to convey their ideas 
about the world in ways that advance the project of radical social change. 
Here we can draw on Hal Draper’s important and influential idea that, in a 
non-revolutionary time, the way to advance the socialist project is by 
creating, not a micro-party, but a ‘political centre’: a distinctive current of 
anti-capitalist radicalism, with its own identity and point of view, 
expressed in a body of literature and usually a periodical publication, and 
able to establish ‘its “kind of socialism” as a presence in left politics’ 
(Draper 1971). It is a matter, not of organization-building per se, but 
developing vital currents of socialist analysis, strategy, and vision, and then 
seeking to gain influence for this ‘kind of socialism’ among politicizing and 
radicalizing people, in the broader working class. 
On the other hand, perhaps we can see today that all references to 
‘gaining influence’ in the working class are in an important sense 
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misleading. After all, the socialist movement has never made great 
advances by simply permeating the consciousness of workers, in a 
unilateral way. Rather, in its high points (the Revolutions of 1848, the Paris 
Commune of 1871, the 1905 and 1917 revolts in Russia, the events of May 
1968 in France, to name only a few) it has moved forward by establishing a 
dialogical process of interchange between the pre-existing currents of anti-
capitalist radicalism and the so-called ‘spontaneity’ of grassroots political 
innovation by newly politicized and radicalizing people who do not simply 
throw their weight behind the ‘leadership’ or ‘program’ of existing radical 
organizations, but instead take initiatives and develop insights that are 
entirely their own. This suggests that re-establishing vital currents of anti-
capitalist radicalism must proceed in the form of a dialogical, reciprocal 
learning process between activists seeking to draw on existing political 
traditions (like Marxism, social anarchism, socialist-feminism, and so on) 
and newly politicizing people with whom they work in social movements, 
who may have their own ways of articulating their grievances and 
aspirations, and their own ideas about how society works or how best to 
change it. 
These two imperatives – on the one hand, developing a voice, and 
on the other, cultivating a capacity to listen to others and learn from them 
– are what anti-capitalists need to address, as best they can, in order to 
make headway in re-establishing radical political currents with the 
capacity to speak to the concerns of wider circles of potential participants 
in the renewal of the radical Left. 
This, then, is a sketch of a first-order strategy of anti-capitalist 
attrition that would be consistent with Lenin’s strategic contextualism, and 
his meta-strategy as a whole. As an attrition strategy, it focuses on one 
basic goal: to strengthen the anti-capitalist Left while weakening the ruling 
class and its political representatives. In its strategic objectives, it 
obviously diverges sharply from first-order Leninism. But it is equally 
obvious – for reasons that Lenin well understood – that a serious approach 
to revolutionary strategy must do so, given the circumstances facing anti-
capitalist activists in contemporary North America. 
 
Conclusion 
I conclude with a general thought about how we might best think about 
Lenin in the contemporary context. Most people who identify as Leninists 
adopt an approach that focusses on the doctrinal content of Lenin’s body of 
work, and the substantive practical or strategic ‘lessons’ of his political 
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activism. But a better way might be to look to Lenin’s work, not for 
doctrines to adopt or strategic dictums to follow, but for a model of how to 
develop a context-sensitive political strategy for the anti-capitalist Left. 
Learning from Lenin would then not be a matter of agreeing with what he 
says, but rather emulating the manner in which he goes about deciding 
what to say. What is interesting about Lenin, on this view, is that he starts 
from an analysis of the present-day trajectory of capitalist development, 
attentive to the balance of class forces and the strengths and weaknesses of 
the radical Left, and on this basis he develops a political strategy for anti-
capitalist organizing that is sensitive to the particularities of the present 
context. From this point of view, the impulse to find historically invariant 
first-order strategic principles in Lenin’s work (about democratic 
centralism or party-building, for example) is fundamentally missing the 
point of what is most compelling about Lenin’s approach to political 
strategy: it is to ignore the context-sensitivity and historical groundedness 
of his strategic prescriptions. It would be better, I suggest, to rethink 
Leninism by re-reading, more carefully, what Lenin says about anti-
capitalist meta-strategy, and heeding his advice. 
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